

LOSS AND DAMAGE YOUTH COALITION

LOSS AND DAMAGE

FRAMEWORK MODEL



COP30 ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This report is part of a series of four reports developed by the Loss and Damage Youth Coalition (LDYC) to provide a comprehensive understanding of loss and damage within the UNFCCC. The four reports complement each other, offering a structured approach to understanding and engaging with loss and damage discussions.

A. Background

B. UNFCCC Loss and Damage Mechanism Decisions Review: WIM, SNLD and FRLD

C. Review and Analysis of Frontline Stories

D. COP30 Analysis and Recommendations

The target audience for this report includes, but is not limited to, negotiators, youth, decision-makers, and stakeholders interested in loss and damage. Its main purpose is to provide the necessary knowledge and analytical tools to engage meaningfully in discussions and roundtables. By building on various levels of expertise, this document aims to ensure that readers are prepared to contribute effectively to high-level discussions and are able to understand the recommendations presented at the end.

A key strength of this framework lies in its collaborative and inclusive preparation process. Developed by young people from diverse backgrounds and levels of expertise across different countries, the content is designed to be accessible yet thought-provoking. It starts from a clear, foundational level and progressively connects readers to deeper analysis and recommendations. This document encourages independent thought and deeper engagement with discussions on loss and damage.



DISCLAIMER

The analysis and recommendations presented in this report are based solely on observations from the reviewed data and do not take into account geopolitical realities, negotiation positions, or institutional constraints. While this document can serve as a useful resource for negotiators and may support advocacy efforts, its impact ultimately depends on the position of each party and their interpretation of the findings. The analysis is intended to inform discussions, highlight key issues and share perspectives of young people, rather than defining specific negotiation strategies or outcomes.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents Overview	9
Introduction	10
Advancing a Relational Perspective on L&D Governance	11
Network Theory for Delivering Equitable L&D Governance	11
Network Actor Types: Blockers, Connectors, and Champions	12
Research Design	13
Data Sources	13
Conceptual Framework: L&D Financing Scenarios (‘Fair Shares’ & Contributor Bases)	14
Analytical Framework	15
Network Operationalisation	16
Network Analysis Operationalisation Table	16
Findings	18
Role-Types	22
LDYC Advocacy Bilaterals Prep.	25
Implications	38
Recommendations	39
Appendix 1	48
Appendix 2	51
Appendix 3	55
References	57



CONTENTS OVERVIEW

The report applies a strategic network approach to Loss and Damage (L&D) negotiations, looking at how relationship structures can enable and constrain Parties in influencing outcomes. The Party-based negotiations network is assessed using the clearest available evidence: which Parties¹ negotiate together in which party groupings². By translating these dynamics into relational maps (network graphs), we examine how relationships shape L&D negotiations, finding ways to bridge or prevent gaps in negotiations. The **Analysis** section delivers and interprets these network graphs to illustrate the distribution of relationships among Parties and Party groupings, particularly looking at those most central to L&D negotiations. This provides accurate and actionable information on how Parties' positions in the party grouping structure affect their type of influence and power, while also differentiating how Parties in different levels of financial responsibility and capacity are positioned for influencing negotiations.

The **Recommendations** build on these findings, exploring how Parties and negotiators can take into account their network positions when assessing the different roles they could take on in future negotiations. These recommendations draw upon the earlier Loss and Damage Youth Coalition (LDYC) Framework Background assessment of the interests and processes driving L&D governance, linking actors' historical presence and contributions at L&D negotiations to their current positions or role in the negotiations, as explored in the decision reviews discussed in one of the accompanying three Framework reports (UNFCCC Loss and Damage Mechanism Decisions Review: WIM, SNLD, and FRLD). The role-types are used as a foundation for the recommendations issued in this report, as they illustrate how Parties can play different functions within L&D negotiations, especially by leveraging their position in Party grouping networks.

¹ UNITED NATIONS
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/list_of_active_unfccc_negotiating_groups_2025.pdf
² Party Groupings | UNFCCC
<https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/party-groupings>

INTRODUCTION

Despite widespread recognition of the urgency of advancing the L&D agenda, progress on the pathway from pledges to accessibility of L&D finance remains uneven. Key steps surrounding the availability and accessibility of finance have stalled in negotiations despite procedural pathways set out for the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD). Concerns regarding these structural challenges have emerged from the gaps within the WIM, WIM ExCom, and the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage (SNLD) mechanisms, as discussed in the WIM review³ and in the SNLD strategy 2026 - 2028⁴. This report thus aims to provide a better understanding of the negotiation dynamics, diplomatic complexity, and relationship structures that shape how L&D is defined, contested, and implemented multilaterally.

³ 2024 review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/WIM_dt_sb62_0.pdf

⁴ FINAL ADOPTED - SNAB/2025/05/05/Rev.1 - Santiago network strategy 2026-2028
https://assets.santiago-network.org/Common/Documents/SNAB5/FINAL-ADOPTED-SNAB_2025_05_05_Rev.1-Santiago-network-strategy-2026-2028.pdf

ADVANCING A RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON L&D GOVERNANCE

The diplomatic complexity of today's L&D negotiations is rooted in the differentiated framework of global environmental governance as a result of developed countries' negligence and rejection for taking responsibility for their outsized emissions, as determined by the Paris Agreement (PA). This framework is underpinned by the formal UNFCCC Party groupings⁵, which function strategically, shifting around at each COP. The resulting climate diplomacy is, in this sense, best understood as not only an outcome (adopted texts or negotiated decisions), but also an unfolding process. Looking at L&D through this 'relational' perspective reflects how progress emerges through relationships, communication, and agreements between Parties with common interests. In this sense, the relational perspective can be applied as a way of thinking about the types of interaction that support effective negotiations. The relational dynamic shapes who can set the agenda, how ideas circulate, and which interpretations gain traction.

NETWORK THEORY FOR DELIVERING EQUITABLE L&D GOVERNANCE

As discussed above, the relational lens provides a way of seeing L&D governance as a matter of interplay among Parties, where the narrative and reality around loss and damage is constantly redefined through interaction. Within these interactions, some groupings and Parties are structurally positioned to exert disproportionate influence over negotiation outcomes because they are better connected. Network theory helps illuminate how these dynamics work by mapping the networks of relationships within which Parties influence each other.

Different Parties have different levels of influence across the network. In this way, the network structure shapes the opportunities and barriers for Parties: the structure of linkages, who is connected to whom, and through what channels, creates patterns of influence and constraint that cannot be reduced to the attributes of single Parties. In this sense, the network itself becomes a force in shaping L&D governance. Network Analysis (NA) thus provides a useful toolkit for exploring and visualising these dynamics by mapping network representations. By mapping relationships between Parties and negotiation groupings, NA clarifies how some actors are enabled or restricted by their positions and how power can be consolidated or dispersed within the negotiation arena. In this study, NA is used not only to describe who has influenced the evolution of the L&D agenda (as captured in the LDYC Framework Reports on Background and Decisions Review), but also to diagnose what these relational structures mean for future advocacy and reform. Like mapping seats at a table, NA makes visible who is positioned to influence the agenda and where opportunities exist to enhance equity and participation. In this way, network science enables this study to examine possible levers of change in L&D governance and helps support more inclusive, transparent, and effective negotiation outcomes.

⁵ UNITED NATIONS
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/list_of_active_unfccc_negotiating_groups_2025.pdf

NETWORK ACTOR TYPES: BLOCKERS, CONNECTORS, AND CHAMPIONS

To make sense of how network positions translate into negotiation behaviour, this report uses a simple typology of roles that Parties tend to occupy in the negotiation landscape: blockers, connectors, and champions. This paper applies these role types from the historical assessment of the evolution of L&D governance⁶, resulting in the classifications given below in bold. These roles are not moral judgments or fixed labels; they are relational descriptions that reflect how Parties are positioned and activated within existing groupings, and they can shift even over the course of a COP.

Blockers are Parties whose alignments and behaviour slow, fragment, or complicate movement toward operational decisions on Loss and Damage finance. In structural terms, they often sit at or near the centre of influential groupings, or anchor clusters that others depend on to reach consensus. Substantively, blockers typically pair high responsibility or capability with low or highly conditional pledges or attach procedural constraints that stall translation from pledge to access.

Connectors are Parties that sit at the intersections of different groupings and can mobilise support by moving ideas and text across otherwise separate groupings. Their value lies in bridging others and convening alignments in Parties across groupings, rather than in formal authority. In practice, brokers may be Parties with dense ties into multiple negotiating clusters or command trust across Party groupings, through influence in regional or thematic groups. When a connector is also a significant contributor, their leverage can increase: they can pair substantive contributions with their procedural role, bringing other actors/groupings to the table. In this report, we also subsume some “champions” under the connector role, given their level of centrality.

Champions are Parties which have distinct profiles that give them ambition-raising influence, but they can often lack the needed positioning in diplomatic relations to connect and facilitate agreements within negotiations. Their positioning as a champion is because they are driving the conversations within negotiations while finding ways forward to move the agenda in a direction that calls for tangible changes in the current policies. Champions' role might overlap with connectors, however, they champion the L&D agenda, they participate primarily through public strong statements and might not be positioned centrally with respect to Parties within the financial contributor base when referring to the NA. As such, champions are often positioned in such a way that it becomes challenging to influence those parties or the blockers directly. Yet, under different financing scenarios, when financial contributor sets expand, some champions gain new connections to (and thus greater dialogue with) contributors. Additionally, forming relationships with connectors in the ‘centre’ of the network can bridge them into positions of greater influence, particularly through targeted outreach. In these ways, across different Party groupings and under different scenarios, the champions are the pool from which new connectors and influencers can emerge. This is why they are termed champions, as they have the capacity to champion policies and apply pressure, generating greater shared ambition toward addressing L&D.

⁶ Framework Model on Loss and Damage Background
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Y_tx0jqYzNzSQ7EMm9P1pp6kKjXnx1aA27uOOIs4yQ/edit?tab=t.0

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design follows a pathway from evidence to diagnosis to strategy in an attempt to clarify negotiation dynamics, and is purpose-built to support the LDYC and other bodies (decision-makers, negotiators and youth) to assess possibilities for leveraging their network positions to shape L&D proceedings, bridging gaps or applying pressure. The intent is to give negotiators a visual explanation for how they can reposition themselves in negotiations, to exert greater influence over loss and damage policies; understanding how they connect with other parties can help them better strategise. Similarly, at transnational levels, the research aims to help civil society organisations (CSOs) and interest groups like youth bodies to better understand how they can engage with delegates.

This study is developed to analyse the evolution of L&D governance, applying an actor-network lens to add focus on the different roles Parties have played in affecting proceedings. For the purposes of the study, a set of role types (blockers, influencers, champions) is classified into Parties, drawing on the literature review advanced in the LDYC Framework Background. Network analysis is applied to evaluate, validate, and visualise the roles, modelling the relationships among Parties and Party groupings. This enables a subsequent assessment of how Parties' network positions enable or constrain them within these roles. Lastly, calculations on financial responsibilities are also retrieved from Germanwatch to overlay the relational dynamics of four different fair share contributor scenarios. The network graphs are provided both as visualisations and as data for interactive use by the reader. Overall, the application of a social network perspective in this context clarifies how clusters of relationships underpin the possibilities for innovation, collaboration, and equitable participation within the COP system for negotiations on L&D.

DATA SOURCES

The List of UNFCCC Party Groupings are retrieved from:

[UNITED NATIONS](#)

Data related to Loss and Damage Fair Share Scenarios are retrieved from:

[Fair Shares in Loss and Damage Finance](#)

Data on Existing FRLD Pledges/Contributions from:

[Funding | The Fund for responding to Loss and Damage \(FRLD\)](#)

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: L&D FINANCING SCENARIOS ('FAIR SHARES' & FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTOR BASES)

Germanwatch's (2024) paper Fair Shares in Loss and Damage Finance examines various scenarios of what could be considered the 'contributor base' (who pays) for the FRLD. The scenarios were calculated into the final case data used in this study, which estimates each country's fair share according to indicators of capability, responsibility, development needs, and historical contributions to global emissions. One of the paper's central findings is that delays in operational outcomes are "purely political in nature and indefensible from a climate-justice perspective". This is made even clearer by the fact that current pledges total only \$768 million⁷, despite estimates showing that the Fund will need to mobilise between \$290 and \$580 billion⁸ per year by 2025 and \$435 billion⁹ by 2030. Such numbers call for greater attention to assess the financial contributor base and to understand where financing gaps emerge. Further, recent ICJ decisions have demonstrated the importance of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) principle, supporting the logic behind 'fair shares' and polluter pays principle. Considering this, the fair share classifications are useful within this analysis precisely because they allow us to ask how both existing under financial contributors (under case 1) and possible financial contributors (under cases 2-4) sit within existing Party groupings. This helps clarify how network alignments and gaps might enable or constrain ambition on responsibility and agreement on defining new sets of contributors.

Additionally, considering different definitions of financial responsibility, which should be agreed upon as part of the climate finance definition, that might create additional complexities, can help explore what kind of relationship patterns supports L&D advocacy efforts and discussions. Changing the fair share scenario changes the financial contributor base, creating new connections between contributors and recipients. As a result, the application of different financing scenarios can provide a way to understand the complexities in the relational dynamics around contributions to the FRLD, which is particularly helpful ahead of COP30, with the launching of the Barbados Implementation Modalities (BIM) and the first round of proposals for the FRLD, in addition to the discussions on the FRLD guidance. For the purposes of this study, Parties' roles in mobilising finance are explored by assessing how the Germanwatch financing scenarios (cases 1-4) reshape the negotiation arena among Party groupings. The cases are as follows:

- **Case 1** (Annex II only) concentrates responsibility at a baseline level.
- **Case 2** (Annex II plus "in-range" countries) assess contributor base by capability and responsibility based on GHG emissions (both measured

⁷ Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage Official Website
<https://www.frlf.org/pledges>

⁸Unpacking Finance for Loss and Damage
<https://us.boell.org/en/unpacking-finance-loss-and-damage>

⁹Germanwatch: Fair Shares in Loss and Damage Finance
<https://www.germanwatch.org/en/91460>

per-capita), including Parties such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Singapore, Kuwait, the Republic of Korea, and Israel. This widening reshapes the contact surface between contributors and non-contributors.

- **Case 3** (all “developed” countries under a composite rule drawing on Annex I/II status, “in-range” metrics, IHDI ≥ 0.8 , or self-designation) produces a much broader potential contributor base.

These case-based financing scenarios go beyond assigning responsibility to illustrate how the contributor base changes under different approaches to operationalising the Fund. This report applies these scenarios within the network analysis to ask where different key contributors are clustered or mixed, and how Parties in their current roles and network positions can help shape new patterns of responsibility along the lines of the cases set out by Germanwatch.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

A network graph consists of network objects, which are formed by a set of nodes in the graph (these are the items of analysis) and edges which connect the nodes to each other, (i.e. representing relationships between the units of analysis). A simple network graph thus consists of a set of nodes and edges, which forms different structures and sometimes distinct objects (see example network object below, retrieved from Jiayi & Dongqi article on the complexity of urban networks.¹⁰




Fig. 1: Models of some statistic tools for complex network topology.

The network graphs examined in this study are representations of the system consisting of Parties and Party groupings (Parties to the UNFCCC; negotiation Party groupings). Network analysis is applied by mapping node sets consisting of Parties and Party groupings, with edges indicating shared memberships at the date of report. Different network representations can be operationalised by retrieving and mapping specific attribute information to the nodes and edges in the network, with each type of network providing its own insights. For instance, threshold values are commonly used to highlight the nodes with stronger connections to each other, simplifying the network by removing nodes with ‘weak links’ and dichotomising the strength of the edges; for instance, the researcher can set a threshold that connects two Parties in the graph, based on whether or not they share a given threshold number of the same Party groupings (thresholding a minimum edge strength). This illustrates the explorative potential of network analysis in visualising relationship structures.

¹⁰ Spatiotemporal Evolution and Complexity of Urban Networks in China, Jiayi & Dongqi, 2021
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352271801_Spatiotemporal_Evolution_and_Complexity_of_Urban_Networks_in_China_1978-2019_An_Enterprise_Linkages_Perspective

For the purposes of analysis, looking at the network positioning of nodes relative to each other can help explain the different types of influence a given node can have within the given network structure. For instance, a node in the network can be positioned in a way such that it forms a hinge connection between otherwise less-connected groupings. These nodes thus form important network paths (which carry information and support dialogue) between other nodes. Nodes in such central, 'bridging' positions can be understood equally as potential blockers or as possible connectors; they are possible hubs for change. Indeed, the network position of a Party or grouping reflects its capacity for functioning as a barrier or lever for change across the network. This is known as network centrality, a measurement of the level of influence a node has within its given network. Betweenness centrality is a type of centrality measure that visualises which nodes occupy important positions on network paths; i.e. acting as connectors.

NETWORK OPERATIONALISATION

Final network graphs are constructed in Visone and R-studio, employing various tools, such as node weights for overlaying data through sizing or colouring nodes. Each network graph represents a mapping of the units of analysis within the given network domain, as depicted in the table below. The network analysis proceeds for each Network Domain by assessing the Network Structure and Properties and the mapped Node Attributes (how different Fair Share Scenarios affect negotiation dynamics), as depicted in the table below:

NETWORK ANALYSIS OPERATIONALISATION TABLE

Unit of Analysis (Nodes)	Empirical Basis (Edges)	Network Domain	Node Attributes (Fair Share Responsibility, \$USDmn, under Germanwatch Cases 1-4)
(i) Parties	Association (Relatedness determined by number of Party groupings in which nodes occur together)	Co - Membership	(i) contributor (yes/no) (ii) share of total fair-share amount (\$, %).
(i) Party Groupings	Association (Relatedness determined by number of overlapping Party memberships)	Membership Overlap	(i) contributor concentration (share of contributors) (ii) share of total member fair-shares (\$, %) (iii) number of external connections to non-contributor Parties.

This operationalisation table provides an analytical basis for assessing the Fair Share scenarios by applying them as node attributes for each respective network domain. The financing shares from each case are also mapped to the graphs. (Case 1 = All Annex II countries; Case 2 = Annex II countries + (countries with “in-range” per-capita capability & responsibility); Case 3 = all “developed” countries, as per expanded criteria, incl. Annex I countries; and; Case 4 = all countries), using a sequential and explorative approach to identify how changing the scenario affects negotiation dynamics.

HOW TO READ AN EGO-NET (FOR NEGOTIATORS)

This operationalisation table provides an analytical basis for assessing the Fair Share scenarios by applying them as node attributes for each respective network domain. The financing shares from each case are also mapped to the graphs. (Case 1 = All Annex II countries; Case 2 = Annex II countries + (countries with “in-range” per-capita capability & responsibility); Case 3 = all “developed” countries, as per expanded criteria, incl. Annex I countries; and; Case 4 = all countries), using a sequential and explorative approach to identify how changing the scenario affects negotiation dynamics.

For parties: An ego-net shows the immediate neighborhood / closest country in terms of diplomatic relations and shared interests ($k=1$) of a focal Party (the country that is being analysed) with edges as co-membership in Party groupings. Dense, multiple connections (countries that are close in terms of regional co-benefits and geopolitical relations) shorten bilateral path lengths (who you can reach in 1–2 steps/bilaterals in your network) between Parties and reveal which Parties sit on your shortest paths to others (potential ‘gatekeepers’).

For Party Groupings, for example, AOSIS sits inside a densely interlinked set of especially Global South-oriented groupings. The African Group, G77 & China, and the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN) register high centrality within AOSIS’ ego-network, illustrating how they act as key channels through which AOSIS’ communications may run. In practical terms, the shortest-path carriers from AOSIS into the wider field are African Group and G77 & China. The implications of this mean that when engaging less connected groups, such as OPEC, Arab Group, BASIC, or even Group Sur, AOSIS may lean on G77 or CfRN Parties rather than direct bilateral pushes. Further, the network also shows the unique possibility for leveraging AOSIS’ unique relationships: from externally, parties seeking to engage or support AOSIS should present language that the grouping can quickly diffuse through its strong links within G77/African Group; internally, AOSIS could seek to co-table text with CfRN or African Group members in order to consolidate a strong core foundation for pursuing aligned negotiation interests. For further analysis on party groupings please refer to the R file in **Appendix 3**.

First, the key **connectors** are not always the largest contributors or the loudest voices. They are the most traversed in the sense of forming network paths which enable effective negotiations. Connectors are most evidently visualised in the graph as the bridges between the two sides of the network structure (with EU states, OECD members, Umbrella Group, etc. on the left and; G77, LDCs, AOSIS, Arab Group, African Group of Negotiators, and associated Parties on the right). This demonstrates how Parties can help form bridges, reducing the steps it takes for less centrally positioned nodes to reach 'hubs', the closely concentrated and overlapping structures. For instance, Mexico, Algeria, or Kazakhstan are unique connectors as they provide multiple shortest paths through which Champions can access other important parts of the negotiation arena, including possible blockers. In the FRLD context, these network connectors can be understood as the Parties able to carry communication between clusters that otherwise are apart in the negotiation network (Umbrella/EU <-> G77/Africa/Arab Group <-> AOSIS/LDCs).

Second, the typical **blockers** (United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia and Russia in adjacent clusters) appear less structurally influential as sources of betweenness centrality across groupings, pointing to their roles as **anchors** inside cohesive groupings. This might enable them to hold a line and resist information or agreements elsewhere in the network, illustrating how outcomes can be affected by the relational dynamics among party groupings. These findings reflect the differentiated intermediation capacity of Parties and Groupings.




Fig. 5: Visone - Clustering Coefficient

The second network graph, above, shifts the focus from intersections to cohesion. The node coloring applies the clustering coefficient, which measures the degree to which a Party's connections are themselves interconnected. A high clustering coefficient, shown in darker shades, indicates that a Party sits within a 'tightly knit neighborhood' where most of its connections are also connected to one another. By contrast, the lighter-shaded nodes are those whose neighbors are less closely linked, showing that they may be positioned across divides.

The visualisation highlights tightly clustered relationship structures such as those formed by SIDS, LDCs, and the Cartagena Dialogue. These high-clustering communities illustrate how certain Parties, particularly champions, gain strength from internal solidarity by articulating common demands with coherence. Yet this same cohesion also shows the limits of their structural reach as connectors. Without ties to less clustered nodes, the influence of these groups can remain limited. This is due to network structures restricting the circulation of information out of these groups, creating reinforcement rather than collaboration. On the other hand, the central connectors which were visible in the betweenness graph (such as Algeria or China) appear much lighter here. Their lower clustering coefficient indicates that their neighbors are not strongly connected to one another, which is precisely what allows these Parties to connect otherwise unconnected groupings in negotiations. This positioning gives them a sort of brokerage capacity, enabling them to carry proposals outward from cohesive clusters into the drafting core of negotiations. Some Umbrella Group members, including blockers, exhibit relatively lower clustering, especially as compared to their betweenness centrality, thus reflecting less cohesion internally on shared positions, but an openness and deep external connections which enable them to influence other negotiations actors. This clustering graph thus reveals key relational dimensions of the network: champions' cohesion helps sustain greater clarity on demands; connectors are needed to bridge, ensuring those demands find their way into discussions; and blockers are positioned to anchor that process.

Lastly, the third graph, below, which applies Visone's measure of authority percentage, a measure in which a node's authority grows not simply with the number of its ties but with the authority of those to whom it is connected. In other words, authority reflects both direct and secondary influence: Parties stand out in this graph if they are connected into the system's more influential actors. For instance, the darker-shaded nodes in this map are structurally positioned to influence the agenda because their edges cluster around influential Parties and groupings, so they can quickly reach a wide range of other Parties.




Fig. 6: Visone - Authority Analysis

This visualisation thus helps show the ‘distance’ of a given node from the rest of the network, whether it has strong network paths or not. Many Champions, by contrast to the blockers, appear much lighter in this graph. Their authority remains marginal: Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Barbados, Sierra Leone, and others are positioned peripherally, with ties concentrated in their own groupings rather than into the network’s centers. Structurally they lack authority weight. Their proposals gain traction only when connectors bridge them into higher-authority centers, where blockers and anchors might ratify and integrate them into text.




Fig. 7: Visone - Structural Equivalence

ROLE TYPES

Blockers (low or conditional pledges, using influence and positions to obstruct or slow L&D finance access)

Party / Actor	Evidence & behavior (short)	FRLD Pledge/status ¹¹	How they are positioned currently
United States	Umbrella Group member; small pledge; COP28 operationalised FRLD with interim US-based World Bank hosting and voluntary contributions framing. ^{12 13 14 15}	USD 17.5m	High capability with comparatively low pledge, remains on the edge of the network. Anchors Umbrella Group positions that slow broader consensus and reinforce voluntary framing.
Saudi Arabia	No recorded FRLD pledge; serves on FRLD Board (Asia-Pacific States seat). ^{16 17}	No recorded FRLD pledge	Board presence but absent as contributor. Anchors positions of OPEC states; shapes Board outcomes without adding finance.
Russian Federation	No recorded FRLD pledge. ¹⁸	No recorded FRLD pledge	Non-contribution complicates expansion of predictable finance base; blocks consensus from within Umbrella/like-minded networks.
Japan	Umbrella Group member; modest initial contribution relative to capability. ¹⁹	USD 15m	High capability but small pledge; not convening around FRLD access. Reinforces Umbrella Group cautious stance.
Canada	Umbrella Group member; modest pledge. ²⁰	CAD 16m (≈USD 11.3m)	Contribution lags behind peers' fair-share expectations. Positioned centrally in Umbrella Group but reticent on scaling finance.
Australia	Umbrella Group member; pledged AUD 50m (≈USD 30.7m).	AUD 50m	Moderate contribution vs. regional role. Aligns with Umbrella constraints rather than leading Pacific solidarity on FRLD access.
Republic of Korea	EIG member; small initial pledge. ²¹	USD 7m	Potential connector through EIG but at present positioned as a lagging contributor in middle-income grouping.

¹¹ UNFCCC – Pledges to the FRLD, <https://www.frlid.org/pledges>

¹² UNFCCC – Party Groupings (Umbrella Group membership): <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/party-groupings>

¹³ UNFCCC – Pledges to the FRLD, <https://www.frlid.org/pledges>

¹⁴ IISD – 20 Years of the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG): <https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2022-06/20-years-environmental-integrity-group-eig.pdf>

¹⁵ UNFCCC – FRLD main page (entity status, meetings, and governance): <https://unfccc.int/fund-for-responding-to-loss-and-damage>

¹⁶ UNFCCC – Pledges to the FRLD, <https://www.frlid.org/pledges>

¹⁷ UNFCCC – FRLD/B.3/11 Compendium (Board members & pledges table as of 24 Sep 2024): https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/B.3%20Compendium_of_decisions.pdf

¹⁸ UNFCCC – Pledges to the FRLD, <https://www.frlid.org/pledges>

^{19,20} UNFCCC – Party Groupings (Umbrella Group membership):

<https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/party-groupings>

²¹ IISD – 20 Years of the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG):

<https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2022-06/20-years-environmental-integrity-group-eig.pdf>

Connectors (bridgers; influence through convening alignments and/or high pledges)

Party / Actor	Evidence & behavior (short)	FRLD Pledge/status ²	How they are positioned currently
United Arab Emirates (COP28 Presidency)	Day-one operationalization of FRLD at COP28; substantial pledge recorded; Presidency role bridged divides. ^{23 24}	USD 100m	Combined presidency leverage with early pledge; positioned centrally across developed and developing parties.
Austria	FRLD Board member; co-chaired COP29 contact group on FRLD guidance; pledge recorded. ^{25 26}	EUR 25m (≈USD 26.9m)	Connects EU grouping with Board processes; procedural broker linking pledges and governance design.
Mexico	EIG member linking developed and developing perspectives. ²⁷	No recorded FRLD pledge	Potential cross-constituency broker due to EIG positioning, despite absent pledge.
Kazakhstan	Umbrella Group participant; alternate on FRLD Board (Asia-Pacific States). ^{28 29}	No recorded FRLD pledge	Connects Umbrella and G77 + China, though without finance yet.
Algeria	Arab Group member; delivered Arab Group positions in GST; also part of African regional group. ^{30 31}	No recorded FRLD pledge	Bridges Arab Group and African constituencies in G77; useful connector without pledge.
Zambia	FRLD Board member (African States). ³²	No recorded FRLD pledge	Procedural influence via Board role; connects African positions into FRLD design debates.
Egypt	Part of the Arab Group, African Group and LMDCs	No recorded FRLD pledge	Egypt is vocal in board meetings, given that FRLD was established in Egypt

Champions (strong statements and proposals; influence without central positioning)

Party / Actor	Evidence & behavior (short)	FRLD Pledge/status	How they are positioned currently
Barbados	Bridgetown Initiative reframed global finance; FRLD Board member (LAC States). ^{33 34 35}	—	Agenda leader on systemic finance reform. Positioned as moral/agenda champion; less central in FRLD finance delivery.

²² UNFCCC – Pledges to the FRLD: <https://www.frlid.org/pledges>

²³ IISD/ENB – COP28 Summary report:

<https://enb.iisd.org/united-arab-emirates-climate-change-conference-cop28-summary>

²⁴ IISD/ENB – COP28 Leaders' announcements incl. FRLD pledges (1 Dec 2023):

<https://enb.iisd.org/united-arab-emirates-climate-change-conference-cop28-01Dec2023>

²⁵ UNFCCC – FRLD/B.3/11 Compendium (Board members & pledges table as of 24 Sep 2024):

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/B.3%20Compendium_of_decisions.pdf

²⁶ IISD/ENB – COP28 Summary report:

<https://enb.iisd.org/united-arab-emirates-climate-change-conference-cop28-summary>

²⁷ IISD – 20 Years of the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG):

<https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2022-06/20-years-environmental-integrity-group-eig.pdf>

²⁸ UNFCCC – Party Groupings (Umbrella Group membership):

<https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/party-groupings>

²⁹ UNFCCC – FRLD/B.3/11 Compendium (Board members & pledges table as of 24 Sep 2024):

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/B.3%20Compendium_of_decisions.pdf

³⁰ UNFCCC – Party Groupings (Arab Group list): <https://unfccc.int/party-groupings>

³¹ UNFCCC – GST Technical Dialogue (Algeria on behalf of Arab Group; AGN mentions): <https://unfccc.int/topics/global-stocktake/components-of-the-gst/technical-dialogues>

^{32,34} UNFCCC – FRLD/B.3/11 Compendium (Board members & pledges table as of 24 Sep 2024): https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/B.3%20Compendium_of_decisions.pdf

³⁵ UNFCCC – FRLD/B.6/6 Decisions (incl. Barbados implementation modalities)

Vanuatu	Led UNGA request for ICJ advisory opinion; sustained SIDS advocacy[2]. ³⁶	—	Norm-setting champion. Has shaped discussions on L&D demands.
Tuvalu	Co-initiated ITLOS advisory opinion (COSIS). ^{37 38}	—	Legal pathfinder; central in SIDS advocacy but positioned outside finance contributor networks.
Antigua and Barbuda	FRLD Board member (SIDS); AOSIS leadership. ^{39 40}	—	Represents SIDS in Board deliberations. Champions access principles, though less central in finance scaling.
Bangladesh	Former CVF chair; advocacy linking needs and justice to finance. ⁴¹	—	Champions developing country needs; connected through CVF advocacy but outside direct contributor set.
Senegal	Part of the African Group, the G77 and China, SIDs and LDCs	No recorded FRLD pledge	Senegal led as the chair of the LDC Group between 2022/23
Singapore	No recorded FRLD pledge.	No recorded FRLD pledge	Part of the AOSIS party grouping - most vulnerable to the climate crisis due to sea level rise and associated climate impacts. Remains outside the contributor base. Central in ASEAN but absent in FRLD finance politics.
Colombia	AILAC coordination; G77 Chair (Jul-Dec 2025). ⁴⁴	—	Cross-regional convener; champions L&D within Latin American and G77 networks.
Sierra Leone	Chaired LDC Expert Group in 2024; LDC advocacy. ⁴⁵	—	Champion of LDC priorities. Positioned at the periphery but can amplify via connectors.

³⁶ ICJ – Advisory Opinion on Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (Press release / case page): <https://icj-cij.org/node/207665>

³⁷ ITLOS – Advisory Opinion on climate change (Request by COSIS):

https://itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/31/Advisory_Opinion/C31_Adv_Op_21.05.2024_orig.pdf

³⁸ IISD/ENB – COP28 Summary report:

<https://enb.iisd.org/united-arab-emirates-climate-change-conference-cop28-summary>

³⁹ UNFCCC – FRLD/B.3/11 Compendium (Board members & pledges table as of 24 Sep 2024):

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/B.3%20Compendium_of_decisions.pdf

⁴⁰ IISD/ENB – COP28 Summary report:

<https://enb.iisd.org/united-arab-emirates-climate-change-conference-cop28-summary>

⁴¹ Climate Vulnerable Forum – History and leadership: <https://www.v-20.org/campaign/the-cvf/history>

⁴² UUNFCCC – FRLD/B.3/11 Compendium (Board members & pledges table as of 24 Sep 2024):

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/B.3%20Compendium_of_decisions.pdf

⁴³ IISD/ENB – COP28 Summary report:

<https://enb.iisd.org/united-arab-emirates-climate-change-conference-cop28-summary>

⁴⁴ IISD/ENB – COP28 Leaders' announcements incl. FRLD pledges (1 Dec 2023):

<https://enb.iisd.org/united-arab-emirates-climate-change-conference-cop28-01Dec2023>

⁴⁵ ITLOS – Advisory Opinion on climate change (Request by COSIS):

https://itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/31/Advisory_Opinion/C31_Adv_Op_21.05.2024_orig.pdf

LDYC ADVOCACY BILATERALS

CHINA

Refer to **Appendix 1** for visuals

CHINA'S GENERAL NEGOTIATION ROLE:

- China is a core member in “G77 & China” and is a member of “BASIC” (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) and is actively speaking on behalf of BASIC in UNFCCC negotiations (e.g. opening BASIC statement at COP25 Madrid).⁴⁶
- China is also positioned in the LDMC (Like-Minded Developing Countries) as a long-standing member.⁴⁷
- China is consistently centering CBDR-RC and means of implementation (finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building), calling for new, additional, predictable public climate finance from developed countries
- China's updated its NDC and published related submissions mirroring the focus on this⁴⁸
 - China's new NDC frames its pledges alongside requests for international cooperation, technology transfer, and support for developing countries. Language that makes China's NDC into an instrument for signalling common developing-country interests in negotiations.

China is in the same group as Bolivia. China can be placed in **both the Connector and Blocker** categories based on its positioning within the different blocs.

CHINA SPECIFIC TO LOSS & DAMAGE

- In G77+China submissions, China's influence is seen in similar language and priorities, particularly in linking loss and damage to means of implementation and seeking operationalisation of institutional mechanisms. On the submission of the proposal “Baku to Belém Roadmap”, the group's position stated,

“The roadmap shall be used as an opportunity to scale up and implement the work undertaken on NCQG at COP29,....not in any way to backslide from the climate finance commitments agreed by developed countries”.⁴⁹ (P3, G77 and China Submission on Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3 trillion)⁵⁰

⁴⁶ UNFCCC, 2025

<https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/201912111926---STATEMENT%20BY%20CHINA%20ON%20BEHALF%20OF%20BASIC%20AT%20THE%20OPENING%20PLENARY%20OF%20COP25.pdf>

⁴⁷ TWN, 2014

https://twn.my/title2/climate/news/lima01/TWN_update3.pdf

^{48, 49} UNFCCC

<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/China's%20Achievements%2C%20New%20Goals%20and%20New%20Measures%20for%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contributions.pdf>

⁵⁰ UNFCCC

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/G77_and_China.pdf#:~:text=Implementation%20of%20the%20work%20of%20NCQG%20decision%3A%20The,the%20climate%20finance%20commitments%20agreed%20by%20developed%20countries.

- FRLD: At COP28, when the fund was operationalized, China did not pledge finance and emphasised that contributions should prioritise vulnerable (SIDS/LDC) countries and remain the responsibility of developed countries under the Convention.⁵¹
- Connector: helps align BASIC and G77 & China messages so the broader coalition speaks with one voice on L&D finance and access.^{52, 53}
- Blocker: in LMDC/G77 formats, takes defensive lines against proposals that broaden the contributor base beyond Annex II, or that re-label loans/private flows as “finance,” which can slow consensus in L&D finance talks.

CONTEXT FOR COP30

- Finance track anchor: China is tied to the G77 & China Baku to Belém Roadmap framing-scale up climate finance post-COP29 toward USD 1.3T/yr by 2035, with strong guardrails against backsliding; this informs its COP30 finance posture and coordination messaging.⁵⁴
- Likely lines in COP30 guidance on L&D: uphold CBDR-RC, protect vulnerable-country prioritization, resist expanding mandatory “donor” definitions, and link L&D support to public, grant-like flows rather than loans - positions consistent with past BASIC/G77&China texts and China’s national submissions.
- China’s ego-net reveals a compact G77/LDC/LMDC lattice structure in which influence is distributed among regional leads such as South Africa, Sudan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Egypt. China thus functions as a hub whose shortest paths into different regions commonly traverse these intermediaries, for instance with Sudan, Bangladesh, and Egypt linking it toward Africa/LDCs. The path lengths to many G77 members are typically two steps, while routes to Annex I are also largely more than one step, often channeled through South Africa or Egypt.
- China is well positioned to synchronize language with South Africa and work with Sudan/Bangladesh to hold cohesion across G77/LDC groupings. Further, it can connect to Egypt or Bangladesh to circulate language, especially among African and Arab delegations, and connect to Saudi Arabia or Kuwait to influence the contributor base. Those seeking to engage China can aim to leverage the multiple channels available for outreach, either through South Africa, Egypt, Brazil, or other Parties in the ego-net.

⁵¹ Carbon Brief, 2023

<https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-briefing-14-december-cop28-special-edition/>

^{52, 53} UNFCCC, 2019

<https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/201912111926---STATEMENT%20BY%20CHINA%20ON%20BEHALF%20OF%20BASIC%20AT%20THE%20OPENING%20PLENARY%20OF%20COP25.pdf>

⁵⁴ UNFCCC, 2025

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/G77_and_China.pdf

GERMANY

Refer to **Appendix 1** for visuals

PART OF ANNEX I, EU, OECD, ANNEX II

Germany is a developed nation classified under UNFCCC Annex I and Annex II (as an OECD member and EU member state). As one of the world's largest economies and as an Annex II country, Germany is obligated to provide financial resources to developing countries for climate action, and is **a leading contributor** to international climate finance.⁵⁵

- Germany hosts the annual UNFCCC mid-year Subsidiary Bodies (SB) meetings in Bonn and the Petersberg Climate Dialogue in Berlin

GERMANY'S GENERAL CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS ROLE:

Germany has been a major contributor to global climate and environmental funds.

- Pledged €700 million to the Global Environment Facility's 8th replenishment for 2023-2026 (As of Dec 2022, Germany was then biggest donor to the GEF)⁵⁶
 - Former Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a 33% increase to the 2020 replenishment (€1.5 billion) to €2 billion for Green Climate Fund's second replenishment (2024-2027),⁵⁷ which makes Germany one of the top contributors to the GCF, with ultimately €4.25 billion.
 - Germany is also a consistent donor to adaptation specific funds, as it contributed €390 million to the Adaptation Fund and substantial sums to the Least Developed Countries Fund, underlining its "multilateral commitment to adaptation finance with an additional 150 million euros".⁵⁸
 - In addition to the multilateral funds, Germany consistently supports the UN Environment Program (UNEP), where it is regularly ranked as a major support to its core budget.
 - Germany met its self-imposed €6 billion level in public climate finance to developing countries until 2025 early in 2022,⁵⁹
 - In late 2023 budget allocations to climate aid were cut back below that target, raising concerns about maintaining finance levels going forward.⁶⁰
 - Germany is EU's biggest contributor, will most likely coordinate with the EU on COP/CMA/SBI items and deliver interventions especially on L&D finance allocation
- » Can be a bridge builder connecting EU/G77 ambitions

⁵⁵ Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-2022 | OECD
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/climate-finance-provided-and-mobilised-by-developed-countries-in-2013-2022_19150727-en.html

⁵⁶ German Climate Finance
<https://www.germanclimatefinance.de/overview-climate-finance/channels-german-climate-finance/global-environment-facility-trust-fund-gef-trust-fund-2/#:~:text=Funding%20volume%20and%20Germany's%20contribution>

⁵⁷ Green Climate Fund, 2023
<https://www.greenclimate.fund/news/germany-makes-record-eur-2-billion-pledge-green-climate-fund#:~:text=The%20Green%20Climate%20Fund%20commends,2>

⁵⁸ BMZ, 2021
<https://www.bmz.de/en/news/archive-press-releases/support-for-climate-change-adaptation-in-developing-countries-98628#:~:text=Of%20this%20sum%2C%20100%20million,finance%20from%20the%20public%20budget>

⁵⁹ German Federal Foreign Office, 2023
<https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/briefing-cop28-2712432#:~:text=And%20we%20act%20in%20solidarity,will%20finally%20be%20fulfilled%20this>

⁶⁰ German Climate Finance, 2024
<https://www.germanclimatefinance.de/2024/10/09/german-climate-finance-new-data-shows-2023-decrease-2025-pledge-at-serious-risk#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20German%20government's,UN%20Climate%20Change%20Conference%20COP29>

GERMANY SPECIFIC TO LOSS AND DAMAGE

- At COP27 (Sharm el-Sheikh 2022), under its G7 Presidency, Germany launched the Global Shield against Climate Risks together with the Vulnerable Twenty Group (V20), an initiative to provide pre-arranged finance and insurance for climate disasters “as a response to calls from vulnerable nations” (the V20 group).
 - » Germany provided an initial €170 million as its seed funding for the Global Shield, of which EUR 84 million are core funding to the Global Shield and EUR 85.5 million for related climate risk finance instruments. (Former German Development Minister Svenja Schulze. “.....Germany wants to be a bridge-builder”)⁶¹
- During the phase of operationalisation of the Fund Responding to Loss and Damage, Germany emerged as one of the top initial donors – pledging \$100 million USD (approximately €94 million) to the fund’s startup phase.⁶²
- The EU as a whole, including Germany, is expected to collectively provide at least €225 million (\$245+ million) to the Loss and Damage Fund’s initial capitalisation
- During B5 and B7 Meetings of the Board of FRLD, Barbados Implementation Modalities (BIM) modalities were discussed upon
 - » Germany interventions repeatedly stressed “particularly vulnerable” focus (SIDS/LDCs) and at B6 debates, Germany aligned with developed-country trend to set minimum floors for SIDS/LDCs (critics warn this can narrow broader developing-country access).
- FRLD Board further works on delivering a long-term resource-mobilisation strategy by end-2025 with the draft strategy requested for B9.
 - » after BIM’s \$250 million, only \$149.89 million left - risk of running dry by 2026/27 without new pledges.⁶³
 - » FRLD Board met BMZ⁶⁴ in Bonn and at Spring Meetings; noted Germany honoured and released its FrLD pledges and discussed accelerating capitalisation and the \$250 million BIM rollout.⁶⁵
- German L&D Finance Fair Share (LDC advocacy estimate): \$34.06 billion per year

⁶¹ The V20, 2022

<https://www.v-20.org/v20-and-g7-jointly-launch-global-shield-against-climate-risks-at-cop27#:~:text=Svenja%20Schulze%2C%20Federal%20Development%20Minister,builder>.

⁶² Climate Home News, 2023

<https://www.climatechangenews.com/2023/11/30/countries-pledge-400m-to-set-up-loss-and-damage-fund/#:~:text=Following%20the%20text's%20adoption%2C%20a,5m%29%20and%20Japan%20%28%2410m>

⁶³ Loss and Damage Collaboration, 2025

<https://www.lossanddamagecollaboration.org/resources/what-happened-at-the-seventh-meeting-of-the-board-of-the-fund-for-responding-to-loss-and-damage-a-rapid-reaction>

⁶⁴ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

<https://www.bmz.de/en/>

⁶⁵ FRLD, 2025

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/frld_sebasitanlesch-frld-frld-activity-7292263843920011266-PTIE/

GERMANY CONTEXT FOR COP30

- Continued friction over eligibility/focus (SIDS/LDC floors vs. wider developing-country access), suggesting that LDC and SIDs should have a minimum of 50% of the Fund.
- Discussing clarity of the complementarity and cooperation between FRLD and SN.
- GER supports launching the BIM call at COP30 and rapid disbursement under interim rules.⁶⁶
- GER welcomes Board work toward a 2025 resource-mobilisation strategy and supports predictable replenishment alongside ongoing contributions.⁶⁷
 - * Political window for GER/EU to fill the fund
 - * Efforts in 2026-2029 replenishment plan
 - » Broader contributor base (G20/high emitters)
- Broader contributor base (G20/high emitters)
- Germany's ego-net places it near the center of the Annex I network, with short corridors to the UK, USA, Nordics, Japan, and Canada. This is a champion position: diffusion across Annex I is fast, with path lengths to most Annex I Parties often only one to two steps, and strong influence on negotiations through EU/EIG channels.
- Germany is well placed to bridge across channels and influence possible contributors. Those seeking to engage Germany can prepare for rapid diffusion of language across Annex I and into cross-regional spaces, and target language that can be consolidated in the core of the network before rapidly spreading out through key Parties such as the UK, Japan, Canada, or Australia.

BELGIUM

Refer to **Appendix 1** for visuals

PART OF ANNEX I, EU, OECD, ANNEX II^{68, 69}

Belgium could be a **potential connector** for the Loss and Damage Policies within the UNFCCC as it supports the multilateral agreements and aligns with EU ambition. It also bridges the gap between more ambitious and more cautious EU member states. Belgium governance structure, however, is split between regional and federal governments and this makes it difficult to adopt strong positions internationally.

⁶⁶ Climate Home News, 2025

<https://www.climatechangenews.com/2025/10/09/loss-and-damage-fund-will-launch-call-for-proposals-at-cop30>

⁶⁷ Loss and Damage Collaboration, 2025

<https://www.lossanddamagecollaboration.org/resources/what-happened-at-the-seventh-meeting-of-the-board-of-the-fund-for-responding-to-loss-and-damage-a-rapid-reaction>

⁶⁸ Active Negotiating Groups, UNFCCC

<https://unfccc.int/documents/648981>

⁶⁹ Convention text with Annexes, UNFCCC

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/convention_text_with_annexes_english_for_posting.pdf

BELGIUM GENERAL CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS ROLE:

- Belgium is a long-term partner of United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and contributes 4 million euros per year to the overall operation of the programme
- In 2018, Belgium contributed 60 million euros to the 7th Global Environment Facility (GEF) replenishment running from mid-2018 to mid-2022. Belgium intends to contribute 92.5 million euros to the 8th GEF.
- Belgian development cooperation contributed 50 million euros to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) during the initial phase. For the period of the first recomposition (2020-2023), Belgium doubled its contribution to EUR 100 million.⁷⁰
- During the African Climate Summit in September 2025, Belgium highlighted its commitment to climate diplomacy, in particular advocating for innovative climate financing mechanisms. Jean-Luc Crucke, Belgian Minister for Mobility, Climate and Ecological Transition said: “Belgium stands firmly alongside African nations in the fight against climate change. In my vision for a partnership between Belgium and Africa on climate change, we build mutually beneficial partnerships for the green energy transition, support Africa’s priorities in terms of adaptation and stand together for the preservation of the lungs of our planet, the African forests. The Africa Climate Summit is a vital platform to amplify African leadership and ensure that climate action is both just and effective,”

BELGIUM SPECIFIC TO LOSS AND DAMAGE:

- Belgium’s approach to loss and damage is shaped by its complex governance structure, where climate policy responsibilities are divided among the national and regional governments. Of the three Belgian regions (Flemish, Walloon, and Brussels-capital region) the positions on loss and damage differ significantly. The Flemish region is a blocker for loss and damage, the Flemish Environmental minister Zuhail Demir stating after COP27 “at the Belgian level, we had agreed that there would be no additional funding streams for damage to developing countries because we are already doing climate finance today.”. On the other hand, the Wallonia region is a champion for loss and damage action. This is through its pledges towards the loss and damage fund in both 2021 and 2022.
- Following the devastating floods it experienced, Wallonia took the lead among Belgian regions.⁷¹ At COP26 Walloon climate minister joined the Scottish Initiative and made a symbolic pledge of 1 million euros to the Loss and Damage fund. 3 As of February 2025, the Walloon Region of Belgium pledged 2 million Euros to the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage. From the pledged amount, 1.05 million dollars has been delivered to the fund.

⁷⁰ Diplomatie, Belgium

<https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy-areas/striving-global-solidarity/environment/partners>

⁷¹ Climate Funds Update

<https://climatefundsupdate.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/CFFI3-2025-ENG-FRLD-DIGITAL.pdf>

- While the national Belgian government is yet to make a direct contribution to the loss and damage fund, it has incorporated loss and damage considerations into its broader climate support efforts. Within the 25 million euros climate support package for Mozambique, Belgium has allocated 2.5 million euros specifically to combat climate change impacts from loss and damage. In the high-level national statement at COP28, Belgium said: “We are exploring innovative instruments such as debt for climate swaps. In Mozambique, such an instrument will facilitate the implementation of the national loss and damage strategy.”
- Overall, although Belgium supports climate finance and has made contributions to Loss and Damage, particularly through the Wallonia region, it is not among the leading European contributors or champions on this issue. While Belgium’s diplomatic position within the EU could allow it to act as a connector between progressive and more cautious member states, there is currently limited evidence of it playing an active leadership role in shaping the Loss and Damage agenda.

CONTEXT FOR COP30

- Hub for international organisations: Brussels is home to EU institutions, NGO’s, and think tanks, giving Belgium a strong position for advocacy and coalition-building.
- Belgium’s experience with the 2021 floods in Walloon region created a close-to-home understanding of the need for Loss and Damage finance. The region has already pledged to the Fund [6], and this experience could be used to reinforce solidarity and position Belgium as a potential champion on L&D within the EU.
- Belgium’s ego-net situates it similarly to Germany, within a dense EU/Annex I core, tightly coupled to Benelux and with short corridors to Nordics and Umbrella Group members. This is a champion position: diffusion of ideas and languages is rapid within this dense core. Path lengths to most Annex I Parties are often one to two steps, whereas routes into much of the G77 tend to be two to three, typically via EU/EIG channels. Shortest paths outward are especially channeled via the UK and Germany into Umbrella, the Netherlands or Sweden toward Nordics, and Italy or Spain toward Mediterranean and GRULAC counterparts.
- Belgium is well placed to consolidate an EU position on L&D - such as predictability, innovative sources, and access safeguards and support its neighbors to carry it across clusters. Those seeking to engage Belgium can present language that can be diffused rapidly in the EU, as well as use the UK or Germany as intermediaries.

BOLIVIA

Refer to **Appendix 1** for visuals

PART OF ALBA, G77&CHINA, LMDCS, LLDC

- Bolivia is a **connector** for the Loss and Damage Policies within the UNFCCC
- Bolivia has a justice-oriented language both in its statements and National Plans, like the rights of “Mother-Earth” term, which was mentioned 50 times in its Nationally Determined Contributions⁷² and “climate justice,” which was mentioned 9 times along with equity and common but differentiated responsibilities. In its NDCs, it treats loss and damage as part of a holistic approach, embedding it in each and every aspect.
- In 2001⁷³ and 2014⁷⁴, Bolivia played a leading role in trade negotiations and represented the G77&China. With its connection to Latin America, the possibility of Bolivia’s influence on L&D policies is high and with the presence of LDYC members/negotiators from Rwanda and Nepal, approaching Bolivia through multilaterals would be a step forward to amplify youth voices within the discussions through sharing the demands with their negotiators.
- In 2015, in Bonn, Bolivia and Ecuador supported adding protection of the integrity of Mother Earth and the right to development⁷⁵. In addition to supporting the reference to 1.5 degrees with the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and Singapore (neutral position - left AOSIS in the early 1990s).

BOLIVIA SPECIFIC TO LOSS AND DAMAGE

- Bolivia bases its calls for specialized funding and institutional procedures on the fact that L&D is a current, quantifiable drain on development rather than a speculative issue for the future. In their ADP submission on behalf of the LMDC “Loss and damage is already a reality in many developing countries. For example: Bolivia has suffered from recurrent serious impacts of climate change causing major damage and losses. Between 1982 and 2008 Bolivia lost due to the effect of extreme events more than 2.5 billion dollars.”
- Bolivia supports the Santiago Network’s operational delivery of expertise and capacity-building in addition to requests for funding; it views the Network as an operational addition to financial mechanisms.

⁷² NDC Bolivia

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/NDC_Bolivia-2021-2030_UNFCCC_en.pdf

⁷³ Bolivia’s Participation in the UN Framework on Climate Change

<https://media.odi.org/documents/4727.pdf>

⁷⁴ GA/G77 Bolivia

<https://media.un.org/unifeed/en/asset/u140/u140108c>

⁷⁵ Daily report for 31 August 2015

<https://enb.iisd.org/events/bonn-climate-change-conference-august-2015/daily-report-31-august-2015>

- Through the LMDC/G77+China, Bolivia is not only pushing for more funding but also highlighting the importance of appropriate institutional design including the Fund as stand-alone, SNLD operational, WIM full implementation and keeping a focus on developed-country compliance.
- Bolivia is a beneficiary of L&D financing and technical assistance, as evidenced by the inclusion of “damages and losses” in its climate plan in its NDC.
- Bolivia is keen to turn pledges into actual agreements or funding (for the Fund), but the documents indicate that it is more of a demand-side player than a donor.
- Through the LMDC/G77+China, Bolivia has pushed for developed nations to contribute new and additional funds to the Fund for Loss & Damage. In proposals, it has emphasized that wealthy nations must take the lead and that the Fund must be accessible and grant-based.

CONTEXT FOR COP 30

- Bolivia is part of groups like ALBA, G77 & China, LMDCs and LLDCs. This position Bolivia as a connector for Latin America, Africa and Asia.
- Since Bolivia has a justice-based narrative, it integrates Loss and Damage holistically not as a standalone theme which can be referred to for reference.
- Connecting Latin America with the Global South, Bolivia can play a connector role on the operationalisation and replenishment of the Loss and Damage Fund.
- Bolivia's ego-net spans LDC, African Group, LMDC, ALBA, and more. Several neighbors, such as Bangladesh, Sudan, and a Botswana/Malawi cluster show how Bolivia is itself connected to actors with high relative centrality and influence. This is a connector profile which connects LDC/Africa through short path lengths, such as steps via Bangladesh or Sudan, with routes to Annex I are generally longer and more contingent.
- Bolivia is well placed to align South–South positions; those engaging Bolivia can aim to co-table language in order to land on multiple shortest paths in South-South networks.

AUSTRALIA

Refer to **Appendix 1** for visuals

PART OF ALBA, G77&CHINA, LMDCS, LLDC

Australia is among the UNFCCC negotiating group, the Umbrella Group, as the coordinator with other countries like; Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, UK, USA and others. It is a cross-continent group of countries, many of which have been considered less-than-enthusiastic about climate change in the recent past. While in many cases these stances are now shifting and affiliated to the Cartagena Dialogue (with countries like; UAE, UK, Germany, Chile, Bangladesh, etc) – an informal discussion space open to any countries pursuing similar progressive outcomes at the UN climate talks.⁷⁶

AUSTRALIA GENERAL CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS ROLE:

- Australia's approach to climate negotiations has been characterised by a resistance to progress, particularly in the context of its fossil fuel exports and its role as a handbrake on global action. The country has expanded coal and gas exports while avoiding obligations to cut emissions, which has led to a legacy of putting the brakes on global action. This has been a significant factor in Australia's international reputation and its international relations.
- Australia's climate policy has been criticised for not aligning with the global goals of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, which is a key aspect of the Paris Agreement. The country's approach has been seen as a barrier to achieving a global clean energy transition and has been a point of contention in international negotiations.⁷⁷
- Nevertheless, despite its reluctance to enact more ambitious domestic policies, Australia has contributed financially to international climate efforts. The government contributed \$274 million in international climate assistance in 2016–17 and \$324 million in 2017–18. This funding contributed to our commitment announced in 2015 to provide at least \$1 billion over five years (2015–16 to 2019–20) to help developing countries in our region build climate resilience and reduce emissions.⁷⁸

As a connector (bridging positions between groups), Australia works closely with international partners to address the impacts of climate change and supports full, equal, and diverse participation and leadership in international climate processes.

As an influencer like Vanuatu (shaping outcomes through leadership) Australia continues to work with Pacific island countries in bidding to host COP31 in 2026 to accelerate global climate action and to bring profile to the climate impacts in the region.

⁷⁶ Carbon Brief

<https://www.carbonbrief.org/interactive-the-negotiating-alliances-at-the-paris-climate-conference/>

⁷⁷ UNFCCC

<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Australia%20Fourth%20Biennial%20Report.pdf>

⁷⁸ International Cooperation on Climate Change

<https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/themes/climate-change/international-cooperation-on-climate-change>

AUSTRALIA SPECIFIC TO LOSS AND DAMAGE:

- The Australian Government contributed \$50 million to the Loss and Damage Fund at COP29.
- Australia is a member of the Annex II countries, which remain responsible for providing the overwhelming majority of L&D finance (at least 88%). This also applies to Cases 2 and 3 that expand the L&D finance contributor base, emphasising these countries' continued responsibility to lead in finance provision. Even in Case 3 (All 'developed' countries to contribute), eight of the 10 countries with the highest fair shares in providing L&D finance are Annex II: United States (45.6%), Japan (9.3%), Germany (5.8%), Canada (3.8%), United Kingdom (3.8%), France (3.6%), Australia (3.0%), and Italy (2.8%). Note that even in the extreme and deeply inequitable case of expanding the contributor base to all countries as potential contributors (Case 4), Annex II countries would still have to provide 72% of the total L&D finance.

CONTEXT FOR COP:

- Australia would likely try to balance between domestic political caution and ambition to build international credibility.
- However, Australia needs to increase its contribution to the L&D fund in line with its fair share.
- Align domestic fossil fuel policies with its climate finance commitments.
- Support the replenishment plan for the Fund for 2026
- Australia has an opportunity as an emerging regional advocate to build collaborations with the Pacific nations and reposition itself as a constructive partner supporting Loss and Damage.
- Australia's ego-net shows tight embedding within the Umbrella Group (UK, USA, Japan, Canada, New Zealand) while remaining one step only from the EU core. This is a connector configuration. This is especially true with its reach to SIDS being reinforced through New Zealand, and access to the Umbrella Group reinforced via the UK. Many G77 members can be reached with two to three steps via EU or UK corridors. Shortest paths for pursuing multilateral alignment commonly rely on the UK, the USA/Japan, and New Zealand. This means that those engaging Australia can for instance co-sponsor a text with NZ or Japan to leverage the network connectivity and consolidate strong common positions which can then be rapidly diffused.
- Australia is well placed to advance pragmatic steps on L&D while ensuring Pacific alignment. Its position enables delegates to rely on ties with NZ and the UK to carry this into more widespread EU and US venues.

⁷⁹ Transition Pathways

https://transition-pathways.europa.eu/system/files/2024-11/Turkiye_Long_Term_Climate_Strategy.pdf

⁸⁰ Country Analysis Brief

https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_long/Turkiye/turkiye.pdf

⁸¹ Importance of Domestic Coal

<https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/1522635>

⁸² The beginning of the end for fossil fuels

<https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/themes/climate-change/international-cooperation-on-climate-change>

TÜRKIYE

Refer to Appendix 1 for visuals

PART OF ANNEX I, EU, OECD, ANNEX II

Türkiye influences and blocks the Loss and Damage Policies within the UNFCCC. In COP28, Türkiye was adamant about its persistence on its notion on fossil fuel due to its continued reliance on imported natural gas and oil, significant domestic lignite reserves, and strategic ambitions to become a gas hub. While Türkiye aims for net-zero by 2053 and has expressed support for reducing environmental impact, its progress is hindered by a dependence on imported fuels, policy inconsistencies, and its refusal to align with some international energy initiatives.

Despite positioning itself as an advanced economy and a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the G-20, Turkey has still demanded a share of the fund, emphasising its vulnerability to the effects of climate change. This dual position helps Türkiye act as an influencer and a blocker in advancing climate finance on loss and damage.

TURKIYE GENERAL CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS ROLE:

- Türkiye's climate diplomacy has this conflicting tension between its economic development and ambitions, and its energy dependency while having a net-zero target by 2053.⁷⁹
- Its climate action is held back by its continuous reliance on fossil fuels (particularly imported natural gas and oil⁸⁰ and domestic lignite reserves)⁸¹
- At COP28, there was a clear resistance from Türkiye to stronger fossil fuel phase-out language or any binding commitments that can affect its energy strategy.⁸²
- At the same time, Türkiye sought access to support considering itself an emerging economy, however, it tried to develop its diplomatic benefits from getting a developed status.

TURKIYE SPECIFIC TO LOSS AND DAMAGE:

- A complex and contradictory position, while being listed under Annex II, it demands access to the FRLD without paying or contributing to the fund; justifying this by having a unique transitional economy.
- Bilateral and Regional Cooperation focus rather than obligations and compliance.
- European Union (EU): Discussions are ongoing between Turkiye and the EU regarding the climate crisis and future cooperation, with the goal of enhancing climate action; focusing on areas like carbon pricing and adaptation.
- German International Climate Initiative (IKI): Turkiye participates in bilateral projects supported by the IKI, focusing on areas like greenhouse gas emission monitoring and the development of climate finance mechanisms, including a possible Emissions Trading System (ETS).
- Regional Initiatives: Turkiye has shown interest in participating in and fostering regional dialogues on environmental and climate issues, with potential collaboration in regions like the Eastern Mediterranean, though some efforts are still in nascent stages

CONTEXT FOR COP:

- As discussions are surrounded around the operationalisation of replenishment cycles, Turkiye may negotiate exemptions or other arrangements that acknowledge its income status as middle.
- Its geographical location can position it as a connector between countries, but it would rather focus on regional cooperation and might identify common areas of interest like capacity development.
- Emissions Control vs. Reduction: Turkey's latest climate pledge aims to cap its emissions growth instead of reducing them, a position that will likely frame its stance on responsibility for loss and damage. The country's emphasis on achieving a "controlled increase" rather than a reduction could be a point of contention in negotiations.
- As depicted in its ego-net, Türkiye has emerged as a regional bridge between the EU/Annex I core and a semi-peripheral Western Balkans/ Caucasus cluster (Serbia, North Macedonia, Georgia, Montenegro, Albania, Moldova), while also touching EECCA via EU micro-states and Ukraine. This is a connector position with a unique reach to neighbors otherwise several steps from EU hubs. Shortest paths can be found running through Türkiye, for instance from the EU, UK, Switzerland/Liechtenstein on one side and through Serbia or Georgia on the other.

IMPLICATIONS

Implications of the network analysis are advanced for application of the findings to the current state of negotiations and with regard to the implementation of the FRLD and Review of the WIM. They provide options for negotiators and delegates with respect to harnessing their network and effectively participating at COP 30.

The findings here affirm that progress on Loss and Damage (L&D) hinges as much on **relationships among Parties** as on formal decisions or pledge totals. The graphs show how ambition and influence travels through the network, from **L&D champions** through the **connectors**, circulating around to **blockers**. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the network perspective in itself has illustrated its explanatory capacity for understanding L&D negotiations. The network lens highlights the flow of information through relationships, providing a useful framework for navigating current negotiation dynamics and understanding how agreement can be built on issues relating to loss and damage.

- **Track and observe network role-types and processes** (betweenness, clustering, authority) to see how parties are positioned relative to each other, and how this structure creates new opportunities and challenges.
- **Target connectors** (those with high betweenness and low clustering) for **pre-briefs** ahead of group discussions and informals; ask for specific “carry” actions).
- **Engage hubs** (EU/G77; key Umbrella spokes, other groupings) with **language** that supports greater ambition.
- **Work with champions** to refine proposals into **connector-ready** text (short options; procedural hooks; evidence packets).
 - Help **pair champions with connectors** to ensure that these cohesive Parties can carry their message to the doorsteps of blocker by convening **pre-COP ‘bridging dialogues’** among champions and specific **connectors**. Ask connectors explicitly, “*What would work?*” and draft **options** for co-authoring texts that could quickly reach across the network.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering the network implications, in this section, recommendations are provided to help build bridges ahead of and during COP 30. This is especially true given how many of the most L&D affected Parties lack paths to adequately interconnect and bring their interpretations across the negotiation arena. The Recommendations are guided by the implications in that they aim to extend the perspectives of Parties which are sidelined in the network structure. The section functions as a vehicle for amplifying the information and suggestions of Parties that may not be centrally positioned to influence the negotiations arena, such as many of the Champions identified here. This promotes more equitable participation and helps bridge gaps among Party groupings. Additionally, the earlier LDYC Framework reports are assessed and integrated to the Recommendations.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

- A fit-for-purpose technical assistance for developing countries for analysing and communicating gaps in action to respond to loss and damage within the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage.
 - ◆ The loss and damage contact points for developing countries should be fully established and actively engaged in the decision-making process to ensure a proper integration of the national circumstances for policies, procedures, and projects to respond to loss and damage.
 - ◆ The nationally determined contribution should incorporate information on how developing countries have been addressing the economic and non-economic impacts of loss and damage and the existing gap to be addressed within the fund's funding arrangement for responding to loss and damage.
 - ◆ The knowledge products of the WIM ExCom should be translated in all the official languages to ensure that the L&D National Focal Points are equipped with knowledge on the available “action and support” for action on loss and damage and empowered to have direct access on the national, sub national, regional level for catalysing concrete action to respond to the needs and priorities within their community context.
 - ◆ Support for countries and local actors to draw a line separating disaster preparedness, adaptation action, and humanitarian aid from action to respond to loss and damage so that the fund can tap into the identified gaps, priorities, and concerns.
- Developing countries and frontline communities should be equipped with the technical ability to identify the priority gaps in responding to loss and damage.
 - ◆ Insurance-based ‘parametric’ derivatives aren’t a stand-alone solution for responding to loss and damage; however, they can support

comprehensive climate adaptation and mitigation efforts. Like data and early warning systems, they all have aspects of minimising future loss and damage, but do not address responding to the occurring and historical loss and damage.

- The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage should have a transparent and direct access for developing countries, as well as grassroots communities, civil societies and stakeholders in developing countries, who are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change.
 - ◆ Governments from the global south should have direct access and ensure accessibility for local CSOs, with the local CSO having their focal points who foster a collaborative engagement between the CSO and national framework on action to respond to loss and damage
 - ◆ Transparency, feedback, and an accountable mechanism should be embedded in both a bottom-up and top-down approach to accessing resources and taking action to respond to loss and damage.
 - ◆ The accessibility modalities should be clear, simplified, and efficient to ensure direct access for developing countries and CSOs so as to reduce the bureaucratic delays.
 - ◆ Standardisation of the MEL at the national level ensures that catalysed finance is optimally used to achieve the set objectives without redundancy and maximising efficiency.
- Ensure that the source of finance for actions addressing is new, grant-based, adequate and additional loss and damage aligns with the financial commitments of the UNFCCC and beyond, with clarity, predictability, and transparency..
 - ◆ New sources of finance in the global international process, such as fossil fuel tax, polluter pay principles, solidarity levies, etc, should be established with potent anchoring modalities to the fund for responding to loss and damage.
 - ◆ Non-state actors, including philanthropic ones, should be able to contribute new and additional finance for action to respond to loss and damage.
 - ◆ Developed nations and the higher emitter countries should provide new and additional loss and damage finance based on their historical emissions and capabilities.
 - ◆ Public finance should be both the core component and the largest share of the funding available to support actions responding to loss and damage.
- The fund's secretariat should establish a reliable communication channel with non-traditional observers within the UNFCCC to maximise the involvement of non-traditional stakeholders.

I. Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building

1. **Establishes** fit-for-purpose technical assistance programmes within the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD) to support developing country Parties in:
 - (a) Analysing and communicating gaps in action to respond to loss and damage through a gap report;
 - (b) Achieving nationally determined contribution (NDC) goals through clear governance structures including designated national focal points and government representatives;
 - (c) Streamlining decision-making processes and providing essential technical and logistical support;
2. **Calls upon** developing country Parties to fully establish loss and damage national focal points that are well-trained on using the products from the WIM ExCom and the SNLD and ensure their active engagement in decision-making processes to integrate national circumstances into policies, procedures, and projects addressing loss and damage;
3. **Encourages** Parties to incorporate into their nationally determined contributions information on:
 - (a) How developing country Parties have been addressing economic and non-economic impacts of loss and damage;
 - (b) Existing gaps to be addressed within funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage;
 - (c) Climate education initiatives to foster public awareness of climate impacts, sustainable practices, and disaster preparedness at all community levels;
4. **Requests** the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts to ensure translation of its knowledge products into all official United Nations languages to:
 - (a) Equip local leaders with knowledge on available action and support for loss and damage response;
 - (b) Empower direct access at national, sub-national, and regional levels;
 - (c) Catalyse concrete action responding to needs and priorities within community contexts while aligning with broader NDC goals;
5. **Calls for** equipping developing country Parties and frontline communities with technical capacity to identify priority gaps in responding to loss and damage, including through robust early warning and disaster relief systems that integrate local leaders and organisations in disaster-prone regions;

II. Funding Arrangements and Financial Mechanisms

7. **Calls upon** developing country Parties to ensure scalable direct access for local civil society organisations through:

- (a) Designated CSO focal points fostering collaborative engagement between civil society and national frameworks on loss and damage response;
 - (b) Enhanced community engagement, local knowledge integration, and partnership in climate response;
8. **Mandates** that transparency, feedback mechanisms, and accountability be embedded in both bottom-up and top-down approaches to accessing resources and implementing action to respond to loss and damage;
9. **Requests** the FRLD Board to ensure accessibility modalities are clear, simplified, and efficient to:
- (a) Reduce bureaucratic delays;
 - (b) Make funding accessible to communities in need, particularly in vulnerable regions;
 - (c) Enable direct access for developing country Parties and civil society organisations;
10. **Encourages** standardisation of monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) frameworks at national and grassroots levels to:
- (a) Track progress and identify overlaps;
 - (b) Measure effectiveness of climate initiatives;
 - (c) Ensure optimal resource use achieving objectives without redundancy while maximising efficiency;
11. **Calls for** establishment of clear communication channels, consistent updates, and information-sharing mechanisms to:
- (a) Strengthen funding calls;
 - (b) Keep communities and civil society organisations informed;
 - (c) Enable effective participation in climate initiatives;

III. Sources and Mobilisation of Finance

14. **Reaffirms** that sources of finance for action to respond to new and additional loss and damage shall align with financial commitments within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and beyond, with clarity, predictability, and transparency;
15. **Calls upon** developed country Parties and other countries in a position to do so to establish new sources of finance including:
- (a) Fossil fuel levies;
 - (b) Polluter-pay principles;
 - (c) Solidarity levies;
 - (d) Other innovative financing mechanisms with potent anchoring modalities to the FRLD to address economic and non-economic damages affecting displaced communities and provide accessible resource pools for emergency response;
16. **Encourages** non-state actors, including philanthropic entities and private sector collaborators (with a set of criteria), to contribute new and additional

finance for action to respond to loss and damage, particularly supporting local adaptation projects;

17. **Urges** developed country Parties and higher-emitting countries to provide new and additional loss and damage finance based on their historical emissions and capabilities through mandatory contribution systems reflecting historical responsibility and current economic capacity to ensure stable financial bases;
18. **Requests** the FRLD secretariat to establish reliable communication channels with non-traditional observer constituencies within the UNFCCC, including youth constituencies, to:
 - (a) Maximise involvement of non-traditional stakeholders;
 - (b) Provide up-to-date information on demand;
 - (c) Enable involvement in key decisions affecting local climate resilience efforts;

IV. Institutional Arrangements and Governance

20. **Decides** that the FRLD shall be grant-based with explicit inclusion of loss and damage in its governing instrument, providing clear guidelines for:
 - (a) Funding allocation;
 - (b) Approval processes;
 - (c) Disbursement procedures;
 - (d) Eligibility criteria towards loss and damage processes;
21. **Requests** the FRLD Board to implement a fast-track option addressing urgent loss and damage needs, with particular consideration for least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS);
22. **Requests** establishment of clear coordination mechanisms and defined roles for existing financial institutions in Loss and Damage funding to ensure expertise is leveraged without imposing unsuitable conditionalities;

V. COP31 Host Legacy and Operationalisation Targets

25. **Invites** COP31 host countries (Australia or Türkiye) to demonstrate leadership by:
 - (a) Increasing contributions to the FRLD beyond initial pledges;
 - (b) Supporting simplified direct access modalities;
 - (c) Championing the 2026-2029 resource mobilisation and replenishment strategy;
26. **Requests** COP31 host countries to facilitate pre-COP bridging dialogues between champion and connector Parties to:
 - (a) Craft compromise text on eligibility criteria;
 - (b) Balance "particularly vulnerable" focus with broader developing-country access;
 - (c) Break deadlocks on SIDS/LDC prioritisation floors versus wider accessibility;

27. **Decides** to launch the Barbados Implementation Modalities (BIM) call at COP30 with interim disbursement rules enabling rapid deployment while the Board finalises long-term modalities through 2025-2026;

VI. Principles Underpinning Finance Architecture

1. **Reaffirms** that developed country Parties listed in Annex II shall provide a minimum of 88 per cent of loss and damage finance even under expanded contributor scenarios, consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC);
2. **Recognises** fair share benchmarks for major contributors including specific percentage allocations based on historical emissions and economic capacity;
3. **Decides** that action to respond to loss and damage shall be explicitly separated from disaster preparedness, adaptation action, and humanitarian aid in funding allocation to prevent dilution of dedicated loss and damage resources;
4. **Affirms** that new and additional finance contributions shall be measured against established baselines to ensure additionality and not reallocation of existing climate finance commitments.

I. COP31 Host Bidder Commitments (Australia & Türkiye)

- **Pre-COP30 pledges** given that both bidders commit to increasing FRLD contributions (Australia beyond \$50m; Türkiye clarify contributor status despite OECD/G-20 membership) and endorse simplified direct access modalities as hosting credentials
- **Bridging convener role** to host pre-COP dialogues pairing champions (SIDS/LDCs/Bolivia) with connectors (Germany/China/Belgium) to draft compromise text on eligibility criteria balancing "particularly vulnerable" focus with broader developing-country access
- **Australia-specific** to leverage Pacific co-hosting partnership and Umbrella Group coordination to carry ambitious language from Vanuatu/Pacific champions into developed-country spaces; reconcile fossil fuel expansion with 3.0% fair share obligations through concrete replenishment commitments
- **Türkiye-specific** to use Eastern Mediterranean/MENA influencer role to expand middle-income country support for predictable L&D mechanisms; pioneer solidarity levies on gas hub revenues as innovative finance model

II. Network-Targeted Strategies for COP30

- **Germany (primary connector-champion)** can prepare pre-brief on options protecting \$250m BIM rollout while opening non-SIDS/LDC pathways; leverage bridge-builder identity and €34bn fair share pressure to secure ambitious resource-mobilisation strategy language by end-2025
- **China (G77+China)** can engage with draft text linking FRLD replenishment to NCQG Baku calls-to-action operationalisation; frame predictable L&D finance

as means-of-implementation under CBDR-RC while acknowledging SIDS/LDC contribution priority and China's non-contributor status

- **Belgium (fragmented champion)** can activate Wallonia's flood experience (€2m pledge) to influence national EU coordination; position as translator between progressive/cautious member states on eligibility questions using Brussels institutional density
- **Bolivia (G77 connector)** can amplify justice framings ("Mother Earth", climate rights) across Latin America/LLDC groupings; carry LDYC demands into multilateral spaces linking L&D finance to rights-based NDC implementation.

III. Operational Architecture for FRLD

- **BIM launch at COP30** as joint Australia-Türkiye endorsement of interim disbursement rules enabling rapid deployment of remaining \$149.89m while Board finalises long-term modalities through 2025-26
- **Eligibility framework resolution** on COP30 decision balancing SIDS/LDC prioritisation floors (Germany/developed country preference) with developing-country access (G77+China position) through tiered vulnerability criteria
- **Resource mobilisation strategy** that the Board delivers end-2025 strategy incorporating 2026-2029 replenishment triggers; Annex II commitment to 88% minimum share (Cases 2-3); pathways for expanded contributor base anchored to fair share benchmarks
- **New finance sources** that establishes polluter-pay mechanisms (fossil fuel levies, solidarity contributions) with potent anchoring modalities to FRLD; Australia 3.0% and Türkiye gas revenues as pilot contributors

IV. Governance and Access Protocols

- **FRLD Board-WIM Excom-COP Presidency coordination** for dedicated communication protocols ensuring Board decisions on BIM, eligibility, and mobilisation inform COP30 negotiating text and host country commitments
- **Connector toolkit** to distribute to Australia, Germany, Belgium containing champion-drafted short options on eligibility/replenishment/non-economic loss; procedural hooks for informals; evidence packets on fund depletion timelines
- **Direct access simplification** for COP30 decision mandating clear, efficient accessibility modalities for developing countries and CSOs with government-CSO co-focal point arrangements reducing bureaucratic delays
- **Transparency mechanisms** that embed bottom-up and top-down accountability in resource access and disbursement; standardised MEL at national/grassroots levels tracking BIM deployment and fund effectiveness

V. COP31 Host Legacy Deliverables

- **Fully operational FRLD** that demonstrated BIM disbursements to vulnerable communities; predictable multi-year replenishment cycles (2027-2030); resolved eligibility frameworks operational by COP31
- **Non-economic loss criteria** checking Presidency initiative finalises guidelines for SIDS/LDCs building on Germany advocacy and GCF precedents; address gap from COP28-29 operationalisation phases
- **Public finance primacy** on COP31 decision affirming public finance as core and largest share; explicit separation of L&D response from disaster preparedness/adaptation/humanitarian aid to prevent fund dilution
- **Network evolution tracking** that monitors betweenness centrality shifts post-COP30; adjust advocacy if Australia's Pacific connector role strengthens or Türkiye's fossil fuel blocking undermines influencer potential

VI. Finance Principles for Negotiating Text

Based on the UNFCCC Structure

Acknowledging that the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM), its Executive Committee (ExCOM), the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage (SNLD), and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) constitute the institutional architecture established under the Convention and the Paris Agreement to address loss and damage,

Recognising that while these institutional frameworks have been formally established, substantive gaps in operational implementation and strategic execution undermine their capacity to deliver timely and adequate support to developing country Parties,

Noting with concern persistent structural deficits across the loss and damage architecture, specifically:

(a) Institutional frameworks have been created but lack specific operational details, standard procedures, and implementation roadmaps necessary for translating mandates into concrete action;

(b) Funding mechanisms have been established but lack clearly defined disbursement modalities, streamlined approval processes, and predictable access pathways;

(c) Institutional entities operate with insufficiently articulated mandates and inadequate resource allocation to fulfil their core functions effectively;

(d) Commitments articulated by Parties lack accompanying concrete action plans, defined implementation timelines, and accountability mechanisms;

Further noting that implementation challenges across the loss and damage architecture include:



(a) The WIM continues to navigate tensions between emerging economies' development imperatives and climate action priorities, while developed country Parties maintain resistance to liability-based frameworks for loss and damage response;



(b) The ExCOM's focus on short-term reactive measures rather than strategic, long-term planning frameworks, compounded by limited accountability mechanisms for tracking progress and ensuring follow-through on recommendations;


(c) The SNLD operates with insufficient dedicated resources and lacks a clearly defined operational scope necessary to meet the urgent technical assistance needs of climate-vulnerable communities;

Expressing concern that these structural inefficiencies create disproportionate access barriers preventing developing country Parties, particularly small island developing States (SIDS) and least developed countries (LDCs), from securing financial and technical support at national, sub-national, and local levels where impacts are most acutely experienced.


APPENDIX 1







- Australia
- Annex I




- Turkiye
- Annex I

APPENDIX 2

Ego-net (party) — China | k=1 | ties ≥ 2 | color=fairshare_total (Case 2) | size=betweenness

Case 2: fair-share total (USDm, log1p)


- min: 0
- max: 5200
- Focal



Ego-net (party) — Germany | k=1 | ties ≥ 2 | fairshare_total (Case 1)


Case 1: fair-share total (USDm, log1p)

- min: 0
- max: 142900
- Focal




Ego-net (party) — Germany | k=1 | ties ≥ 2 | eigenvector

Eigenvector centrality (relative)
○ min: 0
● max: 0
● Focal




Ego-net (party) — Belgium | k=1 | ties ≥ 2 | eigenvector

Eigenvector centrality (relative)
○ min: 0
● max: 0
● Focal




Ego-net (party) — Bolivia | k=1 | ties ≥ 2 | eigenvector

Eigenvector centrality (relative)
 ○ min: 0.43
 ● max: 0.98
 ● Focal



Ego-net (party) — Australia | k=1 | ties ≥ 2 | fairshare_total (Case 1)

Case 1: fair-share total (USDm, log1p)
 ○ min: 0
 ● max: 142900
 ● Focal



APPENDIX 3

This analysis was made using Excel, Visone and R-Studio, to have an interactive experience and to understand the analysis more; we have included the files and a link to download Visone.

1. Visone

<https://visone.ethz.ch/html/download.html>

2. Comparison between the 3 lists of the UNFCCC Party groupings 2005 (AR4 IPCC Report), 2015 (Carbon Brief) and 2025 (Official UNFCCC that was released August 2025)

 Network Analysis

3. **2005 Analysis based** on the list of the party grouping from the 4th report for the IPCC, adding to it, [Germanwatch paper fair shares in loss and damage finance](#) scenarios

 Framework Model Analysis.pdf

4. 2005 Dataset

Once you download it you can open these files and interact with the analysis:

A. Visone Files

1. Pledges:

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IT4msdfaRg34yR9icLFdSDNOgaPFBZQH/view?usp=sharing>

2. **Case 1:** <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kkueagStOHEr6fnfWrddfz81yEA08jHo/view?usp=sharing>

3. **Case 2:**

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NsRN1TSuEcuGut29FHgtP4Aoo4ck4J0N/view?usp=sharing>

4. **Case 3:**

https://drive.google.com/file/d/14Nlon_rY5RWP1cNwYTJcMmd37Gsw4zy3/view?usp=sharing

5. **Case 4:**

https://drive.google.com/file/d/17GrmS-Zq2HPOZowTsr48V_DjXCYcuHdz/view?usp=sharing

You can then see each party grouping by changing the attributes + the size and colour of the node and then pressing visualise

B. Excel Sheets:

With Pledges:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/18WTlgBysu6Q01caG2nugXM8C4oImt-i4/view?usp=drive_link

Case 1:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Cc4g2ZDdabmZ4Sa6hYeORRUFHLNhAg4O/view?usp=drive_link

Case 2:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1stqHknJUmgfEWonleTulT0iXJE_zBVmg/view?usp=drive_link

Case 3:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CrldU3YOZIkNTNYwyTOPStMzrOf8WeKm/view?usp=drive_link

Case 4:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Z8NxHHyxRuTuazz3bBtCP-lqMbbuz5ey/view?usp=drive_link

5. 2015 Dataset

A. Visone File

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pJrNY00bVvF1e6X5N_VAqBpR0G6ppUAI/view?usp=sharing

B. Excel Sheets

1. Party Groupings and Pledges:

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rKkmbfv2H1LBkP8mpQAOAegOm8mp05oH/view?usp=sharing>

2. Edge_List:

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rKkmbfv2H1LBkP8mpQAOAegOm8mp05oH/view?usp=sharing>

6. 2025 Dataset

A. Visone File

https://drive.google.com/file/d/16SVCLBpbfV602BuuPFEhzRH_5AwZ-dEQ/view?usp=drive_link

B. Excel Sheets

1. Pledges: [x Pledges_LnD_USDm.xlsx](#) → **Second file in the R-code**

2. Pledges and Cases:

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UMNyeDEk5-LRX3uD-bLc7pdL2elmND2Q/view?usp=sharing> → **1st file in the code**

3. Edge List:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/16SVCLBpbfV602BuuPFEhzRH_5AwZ-dEQ/view?usp=drive_link

C. R-Studio Egonet Script

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WrkpvaE_sHkKfUvBNhtai0x7Sgsk9c7/view?usp=drive_link

```
# ---- Paths ----  
#Set working directory where the data is  
wd <- "REPLACE"  
#fetch latest data  
input_csv <- file.path(wd, "Latest Data for Network Analysis 08-28.csv")  
# Pledges CSV (two columns: party, pledge_usdm)  
pledges_csv <- file.path(wd, "Pledges_LnD_USDm.csv")
```

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